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Urry suggests that sociology generates hypotheses through metaphor and that we should choose metaphors that best correspond to the real world (Urry 2003). Ignoring the apparent contradiction in this position and the risk that metaphors are used to tell ‘good stories’ rather than provide ‘solid arguments’, it is a matter of sociological observation that current interest in complexity reflects a Zeitdiagnostik that the social world has become more complex. This, in turn, has led to the search for new ways of dealing with complexity. Among the reasons advanced for a dramatic intensification of societal complexity are: 

•	increased functional differentiation combined with increased interdependence among functional systems; 
•	increased fuzziness, contestability, and de-differentiation of institutional boundaries; 
•	increased complexity of spatial and scalar relations and horizons of action as national economies, national states, and national societies cease to be the main axes and reference points in societal organization; 
•	increased complexity and interconnectedness of temporalities and temporal horizons, ranging from split-second timing (e.g., computer-driven trading) to an acceleration of the glacial time of social and environmental change; 
•	multiplication of identities and the imagined communities to which different social forces orient their actions and seek to coordinate them; 
•	increased importance of knowledge and organized learning; and, because of the above,
•	the self-potentiating nature of complexity, whereby complex systems generally operate in ways that create opportunities for additional complexity. 

But recognition of growing social complexity, even assuming that this could be measured accurately and compared with other cases than the post-war boom years in advanced capitalist economies, does not justify the simple appropriation of models of complexity from mathematics and the natural sciences without regard to the differences as well as continuities between the natural and social worlds. In particular, this may ignore the meaningfulness of the social world and the scope for agents to engage to respond to complexity in different ways. 





Governance is another polyvalent concept. It can refer to all possible modes of co-ordination of complex and reciprocally interdependent activities or operations as well as to a specific form of such coordination. The most commonly identified modes of coordination are the anarchy of the market, imperative coordination, reflexive self-organization, and solidarity. In each case, successful co-ordination depends on the performance of complementary activities and operations by other actors – whose pursuit of their activities and operations depends in turn on such activities and operations being performed elsewhere within the relevant social ensemble. Governance in the narrow sense used here refers to reflexive self-organization. 

Experience shows that all forms of governance are prone to failure. This is reflected in attempts to redesign governance mechanisms and in the recurrent switching among different modes of governance. It is also reflected theoretically in studies of market failure, state failure, failures of collective action based on solidarity, and, more recently, failures of reflexive self-organization. In all cases, despite significant differences between their respective modes of complexity reduction, the continuing excess or surplus of complexity in the real world is a major cause for failure. This explains the growing interest in forms of governance that can integrate the phenomenon of complexity more explicitly, reflexively, and, it is hoped, effectively. This holds especially for the trust placed in reflexive self-organization.

Four factors have been suggested that affect the capacity to build effective self-reflexive governance mechanisms (Jessop 1997):

(1)	Simplifying models and practices that reduce the complexity of the world but have sufficient variety to be congruent with real world processes and to remain relevant to governance objectives. These models should simplify the world without neglecting significant side effects, interdependencies, and emerging problems. 
(2)	Developing the capacity for dynamic interactive learning about various causal processes and forms of interdependence, attributions of responsibility and capacity for actions, and possibilities of co-ordination in a complex, turbulent environment. This is enhanced when actors can switch among modes of governance to facilitate more effective responses to internal and/or external turbulence.
(3)	Building methods for co-ordinating actions among social forces with different identities, interests, and meaning systems, over different spatio-temporal horizons, and over different domains of action. This depends on self-reflexive self-organization to sustain exchange, hierarchy, negotiation, or solidarity as well as on the nature of the co-ordination problems engendered by operating over different scales and time horizons.
(4)	Establishing a common worldview for individual action and stabilizing key players’ orientations, expectations, and rules of conduct. This permits a more systematic review and assessment of problems and potentials, resource availability and requirements, and the demands of negative and positive co-ordination.

Nonetheless, self-reflexive organization also fails. Among the reasons for this are the inadequacy of the definition of the object(s) of governance, the general turbulence of environment, the time required for continuing dialogue, the existence of competing governance projects for same object of governance, and the specific dilemmas in particular forms of governance arrangement. Given that all forms of governance fail, one response has been meta-governance, i.e., the attempt to re-balance modes of governance to ensure more effective switching and joint governance solutions.

Meta-Governance Failure and Beyond

However, given that all forms of governance fail, it is hardly surprising that meta-governance is also failure prone. This could lead to a fatalistic, passive resignation; a stoical, ritualistic approach; self-deluding denial and/or the spinning of failure as success; or cynical opportunism as some actors exit when ahead, leaving others to carry the costs. To avoid such outcomes, three inter-related strategies can be recommended:

(1)	Deliberate cultivation of a flexible repertoire (requisite variety) of responses. 
(2)	Self-conscious monitoring and reflexivity about governance, its objects, and its outcomes 
(3)	Self-reflexive 'irony', whereby participants in governance recognize the risks of failure but proceed as if success were possible. 

First, the need for flexible 'requisite variety' (with its informational, structural, and functional redundancies) is based on recognition that complexity excludes simple governance solutions. Instead, effective governance requires a combination of mechanisms and strategies oriented to the complexities of the object to be governed. Combining strategies and tactics reduces the likelihood of failure, enabling their re-balancing in the face of governance failure and turbulence in the governance environment. Maintaining requisite variety may seem inefficient in economizing terms because it introduces slack or waste. But it also provides major sources of flexibility in the face of failure (Grabher 1994). For, if every mode of economic and political co-ordination is failure-prone, if not failure-laden, longer-term success in co-ordination depends on the capacity to switch modes as the limits of any one mode become evident.

Second, complexity requires that reflexive observers recognize that they cannot fully understand what they are observing and must make contingency plans for the unexpected. This involves inquiring in the first instance into the material, social, and discursive construction of possible objects of governance and reflecting on why this rather than another object of governance is dominant, hegemonic, or naturalized. It requires thinking critically about the strategically selective implications of adopting one or another definition of a specific object of governance and its properties, and, a fortiori, of the choice of modes of governance, participants in the governance process, and so forth. Thus reflexivity involves the ability and commitment to uncover and make explicit one's intentions, projects, and actions, their conditions of possibility, and what would be an acceptable outcome in the case of incomplete success. It involves cultivating the ability to learn about them, critique them, and act on any lessons. Applied to meta-governance, this means comparing the effects of failure/inadequacies in markets, government, self-organization, and solidarity; and regularly re-assessing how far current actions are producing desired outcomes. This requires monitoring mechanisms, modulating mechanisms, and a willingness to re-evaluate objectives. And it requires learning about how to learn reflexively. There is a general danger of infinite regress here, of course; but this can be limited provided that reflexivity is combined with the other two principles.

Third, given 'the centrality of failure and the inevitability of incompleteness' (Malpas and Wickham 1995: 39), how should actors approach the likelihood of failure? The intellectual and practical stance recommended here is that of ‘romantic public irony'. To defend this, I distinguish irony from four other responses to governance failure: fatalism, stoicism, denial, and cynicism (see above). In contrast to fatalists, stoics, those in denial, and cynics, ironists are sceptical and romantic. Recognizing the inevitable incompleteness of attempts at governance (whether through the market, imperative coordination, or reflexive self-organization), they adopt a satisficing approach. Ironists accept incompleteness and failure as essential features of social life but continue to act as if completeness and success were possible. The ironist must simplify a complex, contradictory, and changing reality in order to be able to act – knowing full well that any such simplification distorts reality and, worse, that such simplifying distortions can sometimes generate failure as well as enhance the chances of success. In short, even as they expect failure, they act as if they intend to succeed. Moreover, following the law of requisite variety, they must be prepared to change the modes of governance as appropriate. 

Complicating matters further, a ‘double irony’ is present in public romantic irony. For the public romantic ironist recognizes the likelihood of failure but chooses to act on the assumption that success is still possible – thereby ‘thinking one thing and doing another’. And, faced with the likelihood of failure, a romantic public ironist chooses her mode of failure. One cannot choose to succeed completely and permanently in a complex world; but one can choose how to fail. This makes it imperative to choose wisely! Given the main alternatives (markets, imperative coordination, self-organization, and solidarity) and what we know about how and why they fail, the best chance of reducing the likelihood of failure is to draw on the collective intelligence of stakeholders and other relevant partners in a form of participatory democracy. This does not exclude resort to other forms of coordination but it does require that the scope granted to the market mechanism, the exercise of formal authority, or solidarity is subject as far as possible to decision through forms of participatory governance that aim to balance efficiency, effectiveness, and democratic accountability. Key substantive outcomes to be added here include sustainable development, the prioritization of social justice, and respect for difference. In this sense, public romantic irony is the best mechanism for working out which modes of governance to resort to in particular situations and when collibration is required. It is not the only method to be adopted in all and every situation.
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